Last year saw a European resurgence of far-right parties, many harboring sentiments sympathetic to Moscow. The election of Prime Minister Robert Fico in Slovakia, for example, brought into government a party that rejects NATO’s military support for Ukraine. Similarly, the far-right Alternative for Germany, which is currently polling as the second most popular party in Germany, maintains close ties with the Kremlin — as does French opposition leader Marine LePenn’s National Rally party, which is likewise surging in the polls. Thus, a sustained rise in political support for the far-right in Europe could persuade Moscow that NATO would fail to reach consensus regarding a response to Russian aggression.
Perhaps most concerning of all, however, would be how U.S. engagement in a major conflict with China would impact Russian President Vladimir Putin’s calculations.
In December, Chinese President Xi Jinping reportedly told U.S. President Joe Biden that Beijing will reunify Taiwan with mainland China — although the timing of this was yet to be decided. U.S. conflict with China isn’t inevitable, but should it occur, the Kremlin would be seriously tempted to take advantage, judging that Washington would have neither the political interest nor the resources to come to Europe’s aid.
Furthermore, should the U.S. be forced to respond to smaller yet still significant conflicts with either Iran or North Korea, the Kremlin could reach a similar conclusion.
Complicating the picture even further is Moscow’s propensity for both risk-taking and miscalculation. Political science research shows that personalist autocrats like Putin are the most inclined to make mistakes, in part because they surround themselves with yes men and loyalists. The Kremlin has already seriously underestimated both its ability to rapidly defeat Ukraine’s military, as well as the West’s response to the invasion.
Thus, once Russia reconstitutes its conventional forces after fighting in Ukraine subsides — many European leaders project that Moscow could rebuild its forces as soon as two to five years’ time — it will again pose a significant threat to NATO countries in the east. As NATO’s forces are likely to remain conventionally superior, it will still be well positioned to deter or defeat this threat — but this will only be the case as long as the U.S. remains fully committed to the alliance and isn’t engaged in a major conflict elsewhere.