Bezuhla, a former deputy chair of the Parliamentary Committee on National Security and Defense, isn’t alone in thinking Ukrainian commanders made tactical errors in Pokrovsk, including diverting reinforcements to Dobropillia at a key moment.
Now there’s concern that the Russians are seeking to capitalize on Ukraine’s rearguard action in Pokrovsk by mounting forays into Dnipropetrovsk region in the south and Zaporizhzhia. “Despite the heroism and modernity of many people in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the Ukrainian army’s decision-making system simply can’t keep up and is being jerked around within a framework set by the enemy,” Bezuhla added.
The battle for Pokrovsk has again highlighted Ukraine’s severe manpower shortage. In some sections of the front line, Russia enjoys a 10-to-1 manpower advantage. In the countryside, that isn’t such a problem as drones and remote-controlled systems dominate the battlefield. But when engagements involve close-quarter combat in urban settings, as in Pokrovsk, the Russians have an advantage.
Aside from worries over funding and what’s happening on the battlefield, there’s the third big challenge of the winter — the energy war.
In past winters, Ukrainians were focused on keeping the lights on as Russian airstrikes relentlessly pummeled its power grid, part of the Kremlin’s strategy to enlist “General Winter” to exhaust Ukrainians’ stubborn spirit of resistance. Thanks to Ukrainian improvisation and engineering ingenuity in patching up the damaged system, along with energy imports from Europe, the lights largely stayed on — albeit with rolling blackouts and outages, among the worst back in October 2022.
This time round, though, the Russian attacks are of much greater magnitude and the Ukrainians don’t have the air defenses to cope, nor are they likely to get them soon. On top of that, Russia has adjusted its tactics by targeting not only the power grid but also Ukraine’s natural gas infrastructure. Sixty percent of Ukrainians rely on natural gas to keep their homes warm.