By Prof Dr Sven Biscop, acting director-general, Egmont Institute
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The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent in any way the editorial position of Euronews.
US President Franklin D Roosevelt was sincere in his altruism. Of course, the US is at the centre of the international order of which, in 1944-45, he laid the foundation, not least in the economic sphere.
But most other states saw their interests served as well, and so they accepted that the US, as the strongest of the great powers and ultimate guarantor of the order, occasionally acted against the rules, as long as Washington continued to uphold the system at large.
The illegal invasion of Iraq in 2003 greatly damaged that trust in the US. But in the end it was not a turning point for the world order as such, because the US pretended that its war precisely served to uphold the order – even though that was clearly untrue and the result was 15 years of chaos in the region.
Today, the US has given up all pretence. In kidnapping Maduro, the Trump administration purposely puts itself outside the international order.
Instead of a multilateral order in which all states have a say – even though, of course, some are more equal than others – Trump seeks to divide the world between the US, Russia and China.
A dangerous plan
Last December’s National Security Strategy is not a piece of paper, put a plan that is being executed.
The Americas, North and South, are the sphere of influence of the US. The taking of Maduro is a message to his supporters, Russia and China, that Trump is serious: clear out.
That immediately raises the question: will Trump also enforce this against Europe and appropriate Greenland?
And what, then, in Trump’s view is the sphere of influence of Russia and China? Which concessions is he ready to make to achieve the deal he is seeking with them? This is where it becomes dangerous for Europe.
For Trump, peace in Ukraine is not an objective in its own right, but an instrument to normalise relations with Russia. For Putin, therefore, this American strategy is very good news.
Has Trump indicated red lines to Putin? He certainly seems willing to sacrifice large parts of Ukraine.
Fortunately, Europe has forced itself into the negotiations, using the leverage it still has: Trump cannot control European support for Ukraine and sanctions against Russia.
Thus far, Europe has been able to avoid a deal that would force too many concessions upon Ukraine. But what if for Trump even the sovereignty of certain current EU and NATO members is not a red line?
Even if a peace agreement for Ukraine could be concluded, none of this serves to durably contain Russian ambitions.
Xi is probably also rather pleased with an American strategy that eyes a pragmatic deal rather than perennial confrontation.
Moreover, China does not consider Russia as a real global player: for Beijing, Trump’s vision effectively amounts to partitioning the world between two, not three powers.
On the other hand, Trump uses stronger language on Taiwan than Biden, to China’s frustration.
Yet at the same time, Trump forces Taiwan to invest in chips production in the US (and to pay for American weapons that aren’t delivered until years later). Once again, Trump’s red lines are not clear.
That ambiguity may serve a strategic purpose: it signals to Russia and China that they better tread carefully. Or Trump just does not know yet.
On one thing Trump is utterly unambiguous, though: the EU must disappear. Europe must implement, not co-decide, and that is far easier if Trump has to deal only with the individual European states, where he is helping to bring extreme right allies to power.
NATO may continue to exist, but since Trump sees Russia as a partner rather than a threat, the alliance is not actually important to him. It was already a Russian as well as Chinese tactic to treat Europe as quantité négligeable.
Now the US does the same, it will encourage the others even more to act assertively against Europe.
Where is Europe?
Can the existing international order be saved? Perhaps. No state wants to be coerced into the sphere of influence of another: Europe must use that.
Even China likely is not entirely sure whether abandoning the existing order is such a good idea: Beijing is gaining a lot of influence in the system, and needs stability to implement its geoeconomic strategy.
And China will definitely not simply abandon its strong presence in Latin America. Moreover, how much value has an agreement with someone as fickle as Trump anyway?
But, if Europe wants to maintain a rules-based order, it will have to act itself to save it. Stop being afraid of the US reaction.
Therefore, Trump’s NSS already is a declaration of hostilities against the EU. The all too prudent reactions following Maduro’s kidnapping are a grave error of judgement: this is not about Venezuela, but about Trump’s strategy for the world.
What world does Europe stand for then? A firm and unanimous condemnation of any attempt, including from the US, to create a sphere of influence by force of arms would be a good start to clarify Europe’s position and start recruiting partners for its cause. But first we must have a cause.
Prof Dr Sven Biscop is acting director-general of the Egmont Institute and lectures at Ghent University.