The clearest sign of escalation is on Musk’s X platform, formerly Twitter.

The report, reviewed by POLITICO, shows a sharp increase in posts from ghost accounts, with activity spiking beyond 3,000 posts in a single day in late January. For much of November and December, activity remained relatively low, rarely exceeding 50 posts a day. But in early January, coordinated disinformation posts began appearing at a much higher frequency.

This “overload” technique — flooding social media with rapid waves of posts to manufacture the illusion of viral traction — is characteristic of Russian disinformation campaigns.

The issue is particularly sensitive in the German election, where the Russia-friendly, Elon Musk-backed far-right party AFD is running second in opinion polls. | Thomas Lohnes/Getty Images

The posts’ content also follows a clear pattern. Many target Germany’s support for Ukraine, claiming Berlin is prioritizing Kyiv over its own citizens. One example, documented in the report, describes a fabricated corruption scandal involving Economy Minister Robert Habeck and an unnamed “Ukrainian Culture Minister.”

The false story was planted on a sleeper website in late January, then amplified within hours by coordinated X accounts, generating hundreds of retweets within minutes.

This wave of election interference appears to be heavily automated, with fake accounts posting at precise intervals.

Berlin is stepping up its counter-disinformation efforts, sharing intelligence with international partners, and considering sanctions and public attribution of the networks behind the campaign.

“We are working on a ‘cultural shift’ within the Foreign Ministry,” the official told POLITICO, referring to growing awareness of cyberthreats. “Ambassadors are becoming more vocal in their host countries. This ensures that when disinformation spreads, they have the credibility and networks to set the record straight.”

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