Knowing that the alliance’s military leader would always be an American avoided the political competition that historically afflicted Europe. If that were to change, would, say, the Élysée accept a German or British SACEUR?
Moreover, the alliance’s European side would, by necessity, include many nations with foreign policies that might be in conflict with those of its core powers. And even if these leaders could be convinced to hold back their vetoes on a given issue, the delays required for arm-twisting could be considerable — as was demonstrated by the drawn-out process of Sweden’s accession to NATO.
Using such a slow and plodding decision-making structure to attain consensus on matters of continental security doesn’t amplify great power status — it impedes it.
Moving on to the EU, making modifications there would raise similar problems. Creating a unified command structure for the bloc would require centralizing bureaucracy to an unprecedented degree. And just as the EU’s foreign minister — the high representative for foreign affairs and security policy — is often overshadowed by the foreign ministers of major European countries, it’s hard to imagine a European commander in chief outranking the chiefs of staff of France or Germany.
Europe remains a mosaic of nation states more than a federal system — the preferences of some of its elites notwithstanding. So, unless and until the bloc evolves into something resembling a United States of Europe, any concerted effort to project the continent’s power will require its major players to form a multilateral military staff.
An historical precedent for this does exist. During World War II, Washington and London formed the Combined Chiefs. And while their decisions were, of course, subject to the approval of the British prime minister and the U.S. president, they created a degree of cooperation that had yet to be seen at the military level.
