Oliver Rolofs is a strategic security and communication expert and the director of the Austrian Institute for Strategic Studies and International Cooperation. He was previously the head of communications at the Munich Security Conference.
It was a big bang, Israel’s targeted killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah last week. And the reactions to his death could hardly have been more varied.
Many in Israel, Iran and Lebanon who, for decades, have been held hostage or attacked by rocket fire from Hezbollah and the mullahs rejoiced; the mullahs themselves made vows of revenge; and Europe’s foreign ministers chimed in with expectedly restrained reactions some might call naïve.
Tooting the same horn as her counterparts in France and the U.K., for example, German Minister of Foreign Affairs Annalena Baerbock said Nasrallah’s killing “threatens destabilization for the whole of Lebanon,” which “is in no way in Israel’s security interest.”
The fact is, with Nasrallah’s death, Europe’s leaders need to wake up to the threat Iran poses to the Continent’s security, and ask whether this successful attack against Hezbollah couldn’t also create opportunities to push back the dangerous regime in Tehran.
Under Hezbollah rule, Lebanon has arguably turned from prosperity into failed state. But with Nasrallah and much of Hezbollah’s leadership now gone, there’s an opportunity for what’s left of the Lebanese government and military to reassert control and rebuild a functioning state — one for the benefit of the people of Lebanon rather than Iran.
For a long time, both Berlin and Brussels refused to believe Iran was pursuing a policy of aggression in the Middle East and that it was supporting terrorist organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah, which had been able to operate in Europe undisturbed for decades. But now, it’s slowly dawning on the bloc’s policymakers that the Iranian regime’s activities pose a global threat — including to Europe.
It should have been clear long ago that the Islamic Republic practices state terrorism. And that such a state cannot be a partner in the fight against jihadism — after all, anyone who sells missiles and drones to Russia and arms Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis is no guarantor of stability and security.
Yet, European politicians largely ignored, and thus trivialized, Iran’s attempted attacks on Jewish institutions, Israeli embassies and European targets. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was responsible for at least 11 attempted attacks in Europe between June 2018 and June 2024, making it clear Tehran sees Europe as one of the battlefields in its conflict with Israel and the West, going so far as to partner with organized crime to achieve its ends.
Thankfully, in recent years, Brussels has agreed to EU sanctions — but they have achieved little. European warnings to Tehran often ring hollow. The regime is unimpressed, and everyone knows it.
But it isn’t just a lack of resolve that characterizes the EU’s policy on Iran — there’s bad optics too. How could EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell — who, to the relief of many, will soon be leaving office — send a senior representative of his European External Action Service to Tehran to attend the new Iranian president’s inauguration? And how could this envoy pose for a group photo with the leaders of the Taliban, Hamas and other terrorist groups?
Simply put, the EU’s Iran policy to date has been ineffective and seriously flawed — and we can now see this playing out in Armenia.
On Sept. 9, outgoing Vice President of the European Commission Margaritis Schinas arrived in Armenia for talks on visa facilitation as the country considers the possibility of joining the EU. And during the visit, Schinas expressed hope that dialogue would make it possible to facilitate visa-free travel to the bloc for Armenian citizens.
Of course, if Armenia were to move toward the EU and the West and away from Russia and Iran, it certainly would be welcome. But would such a move be a serious one, or would it actually be motivated by something else? There’s some evidence to suggest the latter.
Armenia is a country that remains dependent on Russia. Moscow still has soldiers and border guards stationed on its territory, and it controls the country politically, militarily and economically — which means Yerevan has to take its northern neighbor into account. Furthermore, Iran is actively engaged in Armenia as well, with Ambassador Mehdi Sobhani recently announcing the Islamic Republic plans to cooperate with the country to the tune of around €3 billion.
As Iran’s former ambassador to Syria, Sobhani is no stranger to the region. Typically, Tehran’s representatives in Damascus aren’t traditional diplomats but officers of the IRGC, who coordinate Tehran’s activities with Hezbollah and the Assad regime. And by sending Sobhani to Armenia, the IRGC is pursuing a clear strategic objective. (Just as a reminder, the IRGC is listed as a terrorist organization by the U.S., Canada and others, and the EU has been considering doing the same for some time now.)
But why is Armenia so important to the IRGC?
For one, Iran has long used Armenia as a transit point for selling weapons and procuring sanctioned materials. According to Israeli sources, the Armenian airline Flight Travel was established as a front for the IRGC-controlled Mahan Air in 2018. Consequently, Flight Travel was sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department for helping Iran’s Mahan Air transport Shia militia fighters, as well as military equipment and weapons, from Pakistan and Afghanistan to Syria.
Moreover, at the end of July, news website Iran International revealed that Armenia and Iran had secretly signed an arms deal worth half a billion dollars. According to the report, Tehran wants to supply Armenia with the kind of drones Russia uses against Ukraine, as well as anti-aircraft missile systems.
Given that Armenia’s defense budget is only around €1.3 billion, such a deal would be significant. And it’s easy to see Yerevan would have to make concessions to Tehran in return — concessions that could include closer military ties and the establishment of Iranian bases on Armenian territory.
And this is particularly sensitive since Armenia signed a security agreement with France in 2023. After Armenia was defeated by Azerbaijan in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and abandoned by its former ally Russia, Paris has increasingly been acting as a protector and military equipment supplier for the country. This makes Iran’s growing influence highly problematic for both Paris and the EU, as this military cooperation with France could give Russian and Iranian intelligence services access to weapons that are also used by Ukraine in its defense against Russia.
Deepening relations with Armenia poses a risk in another area too: IRGC agents have reportedly been active in Armenia for over 20 years. So, given that Armenian citizenship is relatively easy to obtain after three years of legal residence in the country, is the EU aware of the damage that lifting visa requirements for Armenia could cause? Is it really wise to seek rapprochement with Armenia at this particular time, with the current conflict with Russia and Iran?
Certainly, diplomacy is an important part of seeking partners in the fight against terror. But naivety is out of place — especially when it comes to Russia and Iran. It has become a serious security risk. And EU leaders, the new Commission in particular, need to take this problem seriously.
