This is no longer just about a frozen accession file. It is about strategic direction, and whether the EU and Turkey can still imagine a meaningful future together.
It is also where the deadlock in relations becomes most visible. As pressure on the country’s opposition hardens into a durable method of government, the issue moves well beyond the narrow confines of foreign policy and fundamentally becomes a question of regime. That is why so much of Turkey’s tensions with the EU are driven by the external consequences of its internal democratic decay.
As a founding member of the Council of Europe, from the very beginning Turkey has been part of Europe’s institutional order, built on democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Through its place in NATO, it constitutes an important part of Europe’s security architecture and collective defense. From the Black Sea to critical energy routes, from migration to industrial production, the EU’s long-term resilience cannot be bolstered by excluding Turkey.
This is why placing Turkey on the same plane as Russia and China runs contrary to the EU’s own geopolitical realities and strategic interests. Unlike these other actors, Turkey has a long-standing institutional relationship with Europe and a direct, structured partnership with the bloc. An EU that sidelines Turkey would ultimately weaken its own long-term security and economic resilience.
When the EU looks at Turkey today, the picture it sees is all too familiar: weakened institutions, a politicized judiciary and an opposition under pressure. But we do not simply describe this reality — we live it. What has distanced Turkey from the EU is not geography but the cumulative damage caused by authoritarian drift.
A government that has steadily moved the country away from Council of Europe standards, impaired the rule of law, defied judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, and steadily eroded local democracy cannot now credibly present itself as the guardian of European values.
