Is China an “essential partner” to tackle the greatest challenges of our time or the “key enabler” behind the largest armed conflict on European soil since 1945?
At this stage, it just depends on who you ask.
The return of Donald Trump to the White House has unleashed seismic changes across the globe, forcing nations to re-evaluate their alliances and rivalries in desperate search of shelter against the president’s go-for-broke policies.
His sweeping tariffs, in particular, have deeply unsettled governments, which are now seriously contemplating if the trade flows and supply chains on which they have relied for the past decades are about to crumble overnight, wreaking untold havoc.
For the European Union, an export-oriented powerhouse and staunch advocate of free markets, the Trump tariffs have hit like a slap in the face. Despite the White House’s surprise reversal, the bloc will still be subject to the 10% baseline rate. Additionally, steel, aluminum and cars will be under a punishing 25% levy. Trump has threatened further duties on foreign-made pharmaceuticals, a precious sector for the Europeans.
With transatlantic relations plunging at a vertiginous pace and the American market becoming increasingly prohibitive, Brussels is on the hunt for economic opportunities that can offset, even if partially, the shockwaves unleashed by Trump.
China has quickly emerged as a prospective option.
Thanks to a vast middle class that is increasingly wealthier and, therefore, increasingly able to afford foreign-made goods, China represents a lucrative business partner that can provide European companies with new clients and fresh investment – exactly what they need at a time of stagnant growth at home and political turmoil abroad.
In 2023, the US was the top destination for EU-made goods (€501.9 billion) followed by China (€223.5 billion), according to Eurostat. However, China brought the largest share of goods into the bloc (€516.2 billion) after the US (€346.7 billion).
It was telling that a few days after Trump showed up at the Rose Garden and unveiled his self-styled “reciprocal tariffs”, Ursula von der Leyen held a phone call with Chinese Premier Li Qiang to discuss bilateral issues and the state of the global economy.
“In response to the widespread disruption caused by the US tariffs, President von der Leyen stressed the responsibility of Europe and China, as two of the world’s largest markets, to support a strong reformed trading system, free, fair and founded on a level playing field,” the European Commission said in its official read-out.
The version released by Beijing was notably more optimistic and highlighted a “momentum of steady growth” in ties. “China is ready to work with the European side to promote the sound and steady development of China-EU relations,” Li told von der Leyen.
The exchange, peppered with explicit criticism of Trump’s policies (Li called them “economic bullying”), immediately fuelled speculation that the leaders were carefully planting the seeds for a rapprochement.
Von der Leyen, who during her first mandate spearheaded a new policy to de-risk from China, has in recent months softened her tone. Now, the Commission chief prefers to speak about a “transactional” foreign policy to “engage constructively” with Beijing.
The impression of a diplomatic thaw deepened a few days later when Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez flew to Beijing and met with President Xi Jinping. Sánchez described China as an “essential partner” in tackling modern-day challenges and made a plea to turn the page on the confrontational approach.
“Spain is in favour of more balanced relations between the European Union and China, of finding negotiated solutions to our differences, which we have, and of greater cooperation in areas of common interest,” Sánchez declared.
Then, on Friday, the Commission delivered more news: Brussels and Beijing have agreed to take a second look at the option of “price undertakings” (minimum prices) to resolve the long-running dispute on China-made electric vehicles. The option was repeatedly floated last year but quietly abandoned due to a lack of progress.
Diplomats from member states, which have been traditionally split on how to deal with China, have taken note of the developments, without rushing to issue a verdict.
“The EU wants and needs to be seen as a reliable partner in the world,” a diplomat said, speaking on condition of anonymity. “In that sense, the discussion with China is evolving because China is looking at us differently. I don’t think the European approach towards China has changed completely, but the winds are moving.”
Reality check
The geopolitical winds might be moving – but not all blow in China’s favour.
Earlier this week, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced his army had captured two Chinese citizens fighting alongside Russia inside Ukrainian territory. He later said his government had collected “precise data” indicating that more than 150 Chinese nationals had joined the war on Moscow’s side.
Ukraine’s security services say the Chinese citizens were recruited by Russia through advertisements, including on social media, but have been unable to verify whether the central government in Beijing was aware or involved in the operation.
“I think the United States of America should pay attention to what is happening today. And we expect after this, that this is another country that militarily supports Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – on the side of Russia. This is another one after Iran and the North Korean military,” Zelenskyy said.
The Chinese Foreign Ministry struck back, saying the claims had “no basis in fact”.
“Let me stress that the Chinese government always asks Chinese nationals to stay away from areas of armed conflict,” said Lin Jian, the ministry’s spokesperson.
In Brussels, the news arrived just a few hours after von der Leyen spoke with Premier Li, almost like a reality check that dampened the fervor of a potential rapprochement.
For the past three years, the EU has been dismayed by Beijing’s hands-off position on the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which it consistently refers to as a “crisis”, and by the “no limits” partnership established between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. (Xi is expected to attend the 9 May celebrations in Moscow at Putin’s invitation. By contrast, he has refused to travel to Belgium for the EU-China summit in July.)
High Representative Kaja Kallas left no doubt of her frustration.
“What is clear is that China is the key enabler of Russia’s war. Without Chinese support, Russia wouldn’t be able to wage the war in the amount that they are waging it. We see that 80% of the dual-use goods are actually entering Russia via China,” Kallas said, referring to the circumvention of Western sanctions.
“If China would want to really stop the support then it would have an impact.”
Beijing’s close-knit friendship with Moscow has added to a string of grievances and tensions that have plunged EU-China relations to an all-time low.
Other tensions involve the massive export of low-cost, made-in-China products, the heavy use of state subsidies to the detriment of foreign competitors, protectionist regulations that prevent European access to the Chinese market, surveillance of private citizens and companies, the management of the COVID-19 pandemic, aggressive behavior in the Taiwan Strait, the repression of the Uyghur minority in the Xinjiang region, violations of human rights, cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns.
Any coordination between Brussels and Beijing to navigate the Trump tariffs is highly unlikely to deliver a resolution on this long – and unrelated – range of open fronts, all of which are complex and depend on factors that go well beyond the EU’s control.
Although some leaders like Spain’s Pedro Sánchez and Hungary’s Viktor Orbán advocate for a reset in relations, others remain profoundly skeptical. The coalition deal of the next German government, led by Friedrich Merz, reads: “We must recognise that the elements of systemic rivalry have now come to the fore as a result of China’s actions.”
The contradictions in public discourse – calls for closer cooperation next to stinging criticism – encapsulate the persistent difficulty in finding a common, uniform line of action on China among the 27 member states. The ambivalence has remained even as Beijing stood by the same country the bloc considers its main adversary – Russia – and is set to go on as the EU searches for new partners to face up to Trump’s disruption.
Whether those partnerships are forged on genuine shared values or opportunistic pragmatism is an entirely separate matter.
“Current trade talks with China are not necessarily about working closer with Beijing: they are rather about using this strategic moment of uncertainty to negotiate new conditions and a new framework for engagement with China,” said Alicja Bachulska, a policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).
“It is not a return to ‘business as usual’. The EU would like to get some concessions from Beijing, such as enforceable rules on tech transfer from China or local content requirements, trying to ensure more value-added for the European economy. It remains unclear whether Beijing would be willing to do that.”