Repurposing unused NextGenerationEU funds is another option, since only 41 percent of the €650 billion post-Covid Recovery and Resilience Facility has been used so far. But while the target is €300 billion by the end of the year, the facility is due to expire by the end of 2026 and is unlikely to be extended.
The main issue, however, is that all these options are technically and politically complicated, as they require the involvement of the EU’s 27 national parliaments — at least to some degree.
Furthermore, as ever larger sums of money for Ukraine will invariably involve more weapons purchases from the U.S., it will inevitably face opposition in some EU capitals, even if they recognize the need for more pragmatism in the short and medium term.
An emerging compromise on the European Defense Industry Program, which would enable a greater percentage of euros to be used for non-EU military procurement, demonstrates this growing pragmatism. And some policy-makers in Brussels want to go even further, citing former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s “lend-lease” plan as a possible model to follow. Such a scheme would allow Ukraine to use billions of euros to borrow U.S. military equipment without any restrictions.
Further still, some member countries want to create one overall package combining billions for Ukraine with the EU’s own security and defense and trade concessions — such as buying more U.S. LNG and agricultural products, as well as more alignment with the U.S.’s tougher stance on China.
Such a package is a useful idea. Not only would it send a stronger signal to both Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, it could also help maintain intra-EU cohesion, marrying the concerns of member countries more worried about trade with those more anxious about security. The logic is simple: Spending even more on EU security and defense would result in even greater fiscal transfers to the U.S., thus securing even more concessions when it comes to tariffs.
Overall, the EU’s institutions and member countries are clearly alive to the challenge a second Trump administration presents. More money for Ukraine now seems inevitable, and it will undoubtedly make the front end of the bloc’s broader approach. As one senior EU official said: “The choice is the following: Trump’s plan or Putin’s plan — unless we have the guts to propose an alternative that we need to be willing to pay for.”
And the EU’s moment of truth is fast approaching.